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INTERNATIONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS 
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
? W. Mark C. Weidemaier 
Service of process – i.e., the formal delivery of documents that are legally sufficient to charge 
the defendant with notice of a pending action1 – is generally necessary before any significant 
step in a lawsuit, such as entry of judgment against a party, may be taken.2  This is true 
whether the parties to the lawsuit are located within or outside the United States.  When faced 
with a challenge to the validity of service on a party within the United States, however, the 
court’s inquiry may be straightforward.  Rule 4(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure authorizes the use of a variety of alternative methods of service.  Proof of service 
by any of these methods will suffice to establish jurisdiction over any party otherwise subject 
to the personal jurisdiction of the court.3 
It is increasingly common, however, for litigation to involve parties located outside the 
United States. The expansion of international trade and the growing ease of international 
travel have resulted in a large number of international business and other relationships that 
may result in litigation.4  These disputes have appeared in state and federal courts in great
                                                          
1.  See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988). 
2.  See, e.g., G.S. § 1-75.3; First Union Nat’l Bank v. Rolfe, 83 N.C. App. 625, 628, 351 S.E.2d 
117, 119 (1986) (noting constitutional “mandate[] that a party be given notice and an opportunity to be 
heard before he can be deprived of a legal claim or defense”). 
3.  See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)-(9); see also G.S. §§ 1-75.3(b)(1); State ex rel. Desselberg v. 
Peele, 136 N.C. App. 206, 208, 523 S.E.2d 125, 127 (1999). 
4.  See, e.g., Senate Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure – Establishment, S. 
REP. NO. 2392 at 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5201, 5202-03 (stating that the “extensive 
increase in international, commercial and financial transactions involving both individuals and 
governments and the resultant disputes, leading sometimes to litigation, has pointedly demonstrated the 
need and desirability for a comprehensive study of the extent to which international judicial assistance 
can be obtained”). 
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variety, from product liability suits by U.S. residents 
against foreign defendants,5 to international business 
disputes between U.S. and foreign companies,6 to 
personal injury and other suits by U.S. residents based 
on a foreign defendant’s conduct while in the United 
States.7  Likewise, the ease of international travel, not 
to mention the presence of members of the U.S. Armed 
Forces overseas, lends an international dimension to 
disputes, such as paternity, divorce, and child custody 
and support, more traditionally viewed as “domestic” 
in character.8 
As in a lawsuit between domestic parties, the court 
may not render a judgment against a party located 
outside the United States unless that party has been 
properly served.9  But unlike domestic service of 
                                                          
5.  See, e.g., Warzynski v. Empire Comfort Sys., Inc., 
102 N.C. App. 222, 401 S.E.2d 801 (1991); Hayes v. Evergo 
Tel. Co., Ltd., 100 N.C. App. 474, 397 S.E.2d 325 (1990); 
Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 64 N.C. App. 41, 306 S.E.2d 
562 (1983). 
6.  See, e.g., Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304 (4th 
Cir. 1998); Eplus Technology, Inc. v. Aboud, 155 F. Supp. 2d 
692 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
7.  See, e.g., Hocke v. Hanyane, 118 N.C. App. 630, 
456 S.E.2d 858 (1995); Randolph v. Hendry, 50 F. Supp. 2d 
572 (S.D. W. Va. 1999). 
8.  See, e.g., Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 124 N.C. App. 
255, 477 S.E.2d 239 (1996); see also Maj. Wendy P. Daknis, 
Home Sweet Home:  A Practical Approach to Domicile, 177 
Mil. L. Rev. 49, 62 n.75 (2003) (noting that, in 2001, the 
U.S. Army’s Legal Assistance Offices assisted over 29,000 
clients with divorce-related issues); Maj. Alan L. Cook, The 
Armed Forces as a Model Employer in Child Support 
Enforcement:  A Proposal to Improve Service of Process on 
Military Members, 155 Mil. L. Rev. 153, 153-54 & nn. 4-6 
(1998) (noting varying estimates that the federal government, 
and primarily the Department of Defense, employed up to 
100,000 parents who were in arrears on child support 
obligations). 
9.  See Warzynski, 102 N.C. App. at 228, 401 S.E.2d 
at 805 (evaluating validity of service on defendant located 
outside U.S.). 
In addition to service of process, or an exemption to 
service, the court must have personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.  North Carolina’s “long-arm” statute, G.S. § 1-
75.4, identifies the circumstances under which courts have 
personal jurisdiction over parties who have been served with 
process “pursuant to Rule 4(j), Rule 4(j1), or Rule 4(j3)” of 
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.  G.S. §§ 1-75.3 
and 1-75.6 authorize courts to enter judgment against, or 
process, which can often be accomplished with relative 
ease, international service of process has been 
described as “complex and time consuming,”10 and 
“bordered on all sides with fatal pitfalls.”11  Not 
surprisingly, then, courts are frequently called upon to 
decide the validity of a party’s attempts to serve an 
adversary located overseas.12 
This bulletin addresses some commonly-
encountered issues related to international service of 
process, particularly those arising under the 
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, also known as the Hague Convention (the 
“Convention”).13  Although the bulletin provides an 
                                                                                         
exercise personal jurisdiction over, a party subject to 
jurisdiction under the “long-arm” statute if the party has been 
served “pursuant to” or “in accordance” with “Rule 4(j) or 
4(j1).”  Service outside the U.S., however, is authorized by 
Rule 4(j3), to which these sections do not refer at all. 
This seems to be an oversight.  G.S. §§ 1-75.3 and 1-
75.6 were enacted in 1967.  See 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 954 
§ 2.  Rule 4’s international service provisions were added 
two years later, as Rule 4(j)(9)d, see 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 
895 § 4, and therefore fell within the existing references in 
these sections to “Rule 4(j).”  The international service 
provisions were later moved to 4(j3).  See 1981 N.C. Sess. 
Laws c. 540 § 3.  But although in 1995 the long-arm statute 
was amended to include a reference to Rule 4(j3), see 1995 
N.C. Sess. Laws c. 389 § 1 (amending G.S. § 1-75.4), no 
such amendment was made to G.S. §§ 1-75.3 or 1-75.6.  
Compare 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 231 (amending G.S. §§ 1-
75.3, 1-75.4, and 1-75.6 to add a reference to Rule 4(j1) after 
provisions governing service by publication, formerly in 
Rule 4(j), were moved to 4(j1)). 
10.  Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co., Ltd., 805 F. Supp. 3, 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
11.  Gary B. Born, International Civil Litigation in 
United States Courts 757 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 3d ed. 1996) 
(quotation omitted) [herein, “Born”]. 
12.  See, e.g., Hayes, 100 N.C. App. 474, 397 S.E.2d 
325; Warzynski, 102 N.C. App. at 222, 401 S.E.2d at 801; 
Hanyane, 118 N.C. App. 630, 456 S.E.2d 858; see also G.S. 
§ 1-75.11 (requiring court to verify proper service and 
existence of personal jurisdiction before entering judgment 
against non-appearing defendant). 
13.  See Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, Done at the Hague November 15, 1965 (entered into 
force for the United States February 10, 1969), 20 U.S.T. 
361; T.I.A.S. 6638; 658 U.N.T.S. 163; 28 U.S.C. (Appendix 
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overview, it does not purport to be an exhaustive guide 
to the Convention or to international service of process 
generally.14  Instead, the bulletin focuses on the 
interaction between the Convention and Rule 4(j3) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
authorizes service of process “in a place not within the 
United States.”  In particular, the bulletin focuses on 
several issues that judges commonly encounter, 
including:  
• when and where the Convention applies; 
• what methods of service the Convention 
authorizes; 
• the countries in which service by mail is 
available; 
• the procedural requirements for service by 
mail, where it is available; and 
• the rules applicable to service of process on 
U.S. servicemembers stationed overseas. 
This is not an area of the law characterized by 
great certainty.  Nevertheless, this bulletin summarizes 
those areas where the law provides clear guidance and, 
in areas where guidance is lacking, attempts to provide 
guidance consistent with the likely direction of North 
Carolina law.  The bulletin contains only a brief 
discussion of international service on members of the 
Armed Forces.  Readers interested in a more thorough 
discussion of service on members of the Armed 
Forces, whether located in the United States or abroad, 
should read Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 
2004/08, Service of Process and the Military (Dec. 
2004). 
 
                                                                                         
following Fed. R. Civ. P. 4) [herein, “the Convention”].  A 
searchable, electronic copy of the Convention can be found 
on the website of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act= 
conventions.text&cid=17> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). 
14.  There are any number of useful guides to 
international service, particularly Bruno A. Ristau, 
International Judicial Assistance:  Civil and Commercial 
(Int’l Law Inst. 2000) (“Ristau”) and Born, supra note 11.  
The U.S. Department of State website also contains a variety 
of materials related to international judicial assistance, 
including a flyer discussing service of process abroad and 
links to country-specific requirements <http://travel. 
state.gov/law/judicial_assistance.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 
2004). 
International service of process 
under North Carolina law 
Any inquiry into the validity of international service of 
process begins with Rule 4(j3) of the North Carolina 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Because Rule 4(j3) is nearly 
identical to federal Rule 4(f), federal cases are useful 
interpretive guides.15 
Rule 4(j3) establishes three basic categories of 
international service methods.16  First, Rule 4(j3)(1) 
directs parties to use an “internationally agreed means” 
of service if one is available.  Second, if there is no 
                                                          
15.  See, e.g., Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 101, 176 
S.E.2d 161, 165 (1970) (“[S]ince the federal and, 
presumably, the New York rules are the source of NCRCP 
we will look to the decisions of the[se] jurisdictions for 
enlightenment and guidance . . .”).  When added in 1969 as 
Rule 4(j)(9)d, the international service provisions of N.C. 
Rule 4 were modeled on the comparable provisions then 
contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i).  See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4, 
comment to 1969 Amendment. 
16.  In relevant part, Rule 4(j3) provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon 
a defendant, other than an infant or an incompetent person, 
may be effected in a place not within the United States: 
(1) By any internationally agreed means reasonably 
calculated to give notice, such as those means authorized by 
the [Convention] . . .; or 
(2) If there is no internationally agreed means of service 
or the applicable international agreement allows other means 
of service, provided that service is reasonably calculated to 
give notice: 
a.    In the manner prescribed by the law of the 
foreign country for service in that country in an action in any 
of its courts of general jurisdiction; 
b.    As directed by the foreign authority in response 
to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or 
c.    Unless prohibited by the law of the foreign 
country, by 
1.   Delivery to the individual personally of a copy 
of the summons and the complaint and, upon a corporation, 
partnership, association or other such entity, by delivery to 
an officer or a managing or general agent; 
2.   Any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to 
be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the 
party to be served; or 
(3) By other means not prohibited by international 
agreement as may be directed by the court. 
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internationally agreed means of service, or if the 
“applicable international agreement” allows service by 
other means, Rule 4(j3)(2) authorizes a number of 
additional service methods, including: 
• service in a manner prescribed by the law of 
the foreign country in an action in any of its 
courts of general jurisdiction; 
• service in a manner directed by the foreign 
authority in response to a letter rogatory; or 
• unless prohibited by the law of the foreign 
country, service by personal delivery or by 
any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, if 
the mail is addressed and dispatched by the 
clerk of court to the party to be served.17   
Finally, Rule 4(j3) permits the court to order service by 
other means, provided the method used is not 
prohibited by international agreement. 
In each case, the manner of service must be 
reasonably calculated to give notice to the defendant of 
the lawsuit.  This constraint ensures that the method of 
service is consistent with constitutional due process 
requirements of the North Carolina and U.S. 
Constitutions.18 
Rule 4(j3)(1):  Service by “internationally 
agreed means” such as the Hague 
Convention 
Rule 4(j3)(1) authorizes service by “any internationally 
agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice” of 
the action.  The primary “internationally agreed 
                                                          
17.   See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(2)a, b, & c. 
18.  “An elementary and fundamental requirement of 
due process in any proceeding . . . is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.  The notice must be 
of such nature as reasonably to convey the required 
information and it must afford a reasonable time for those 
interested to make their appearance.”  Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see 
also McDonald’s Corp. v. Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 448, 450 
S.E.2d 888, 891 (1994) (noting same requirement under N.C. 
Constitution).  Whether service meets this standard depends 
on the circumstances of each case, including the availability 
of other methods of service.  See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-
15; Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451-54 (1982). 
means” of service, and the only one expressly 
referenced in Rule 4(j3)(1), is the Hague Convention, a 
multilateral treaty developed at the Tenth Session of 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 
October 1964.19  The Convention represents an attempt 
to “improve the organization of mutual judicial 
assistance . . . by simplifying and expediting the 
procedure” for international service of process.20  
Table A, at the end of this bulletin, lists the countries 
(including any territories, possessions, or other 
jurisdictional entities) in which the Convention is 
presently in force. 
When service is to be made in a country that has 
ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention (a 
“Contracting State”), the serving party must use the 
Convention’s procedures.21  This is true whether the 
lawsuit in which service is to be made is pending in 
state or federal court.22  The Convention, however, 
does not apply to every lawsuit involving a party 
outside the United States, even a party physically 
located in a Contracting State.  Rather, by its terms the 
Convention applies “in all cases, in civil or commercial 
matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial 
or extrajudicial document for service abroad.”23  Two 
questions must therefore be answered before 
determining that the Convention applies in a particular 
case:  is the lawsuit a “civil or commercial matter,” and 
does service require the transmission of documents 
abroad? 
 
                                                          
19.  See Born, supra note 11 at 797. 
20.  See Convention, preamble. 
21.  See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705 (stating that 
“compliance with the Convention is mandatory in all cases to 
which it applies”); see also G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina 
Civil Procedure § 4-24 (Michie, 2d ed. 1995) (same); 
Lafarge Corp. v. Altech Environment, U.S.A., 220 F. Supp. 
2d 823, 831 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Darden  v. DaimlerChrysler 
North Am. Holding Corp., 191 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Taft v. Moreau, 177 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. 
Vt. 1997). 
22.  See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699.  It is also true even if 
the party to be served is a U.S. national living overseas.  Rule 
4(j3) applies to “service upon a defendant . . . [to] be effected 
in a place not within the United States,” G.S. §1A-1, Rule 
4(j3) (emphasis added), and does not distinguish between 
U.S. nationals and other potential defendants. 
23.  Convention, Art. 1. 
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What is a “Civil or Commercial” Matter? 
The Convention does not define “civil or commercial 
matter,” nor does the Convention’s negotiating history 
shed much light on the meaning of this term.24  The 
various Contracting States appear to have divergent 
views on its meaning.  Some States, particularly civil 
law jurisdictions, distinguish matters of “public law,” 
such as administrative proceedings, from “private law” 
civil and commercial matters.  On this basis, some 
Contracting States have declined to serve legal 
documents issued by U.S. administrative agencies.25  
Likewise, some Contracting States may not apply the 
“civil or commercial” label to lawsuits seeking 
multiple or punitive damages or asserting claims under 
statutes, like the antitrust laws, viewed as establishing 
“public law.”26 
Notwithstanding these divergent views on what 
constitutes a “civil or commercial” matter, United 
States practice has traditionally viewed all non-
criminal cases, including administrative proceedings, 
as “civil or commercial matters” to which the 
Convention applies.27  State and federal courts in 
North Carolina have taken a similar view, applying the 
Convention broadly to family and domestic law 
matters, as well as to other types of civil litigation.28 
If the Convention does not apply – either in a rare 
case not involving a “civil or commercial matter” or 
because the party to be served is not located in a 
Contracting State – then Rule 4(j3)(1) authorizes 
service only if another “internationally agreed means” 
is available.29  If there is no alternative “internationally 
                                                          
24.  See Born, supra note 11 at 800. 
25.  See Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-1-4(1), at 149. 
26.  See Born, supra note 11 at 800-01 & nn. 199-202. 
27.  See 17 I.L.M. 319 (1978) (report to Secretary of 
State by U.S. delegate to the 1977 Special Commission); 
United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (Convention not applicable to criminal 
proceedings). 
28.  See, e.g., Tataragasi, 124 N.C. App. 255, 477 
S.E.2d 239 (custody action); In re Letter of Request from the 
Amtsgericht Ingolstadt, Federal Republic of Germany, 82 
F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 1996) (paternity action; interpreting 
the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad); 
Warzynski, 102 N.C. App. 222, 401 S.E.2d 801 (product 
liability action). 
29.  The only other “internationally agreed means” of 
service appears to be the Inter-American Convention on 
Letters Rogatory (the “Inter-American Service Convention”), 
agreed means,” service may be made by one of the 
methods authorized by Rule 4(j3)(2) or 4(j3)(3).30 
Does Service Require Transmission of a 
Document Abroad? 
Even in civil or commercial matters in which the party 
to be served is located in a Contracting State, the 
Convention does not apply unless “there is occasion to 
transmit a . . . document for service abroad.”31  
Whether service requires the transmission of 
documents abroad is determined by the law of the 
forum state.32  So, for example, a foreign corporation 
authorized to do business in North Carolina may be 
served by delivering a copy of the summons and 
complaint to its registered agent or, if it has no agent, 
to the Secretary of State.33  Because service in this 
example does not require transmission of a document 
abroad, the Convention does not apply. 
                                                                                         
to which Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United 
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela are parties.  See 14 Int’l Leg. 
Mat. 339 (1975) (convention); 18 Int’l Leg. Mat. 1238 
(1984) (additional protocol); U.S. Department of State flyer, 
Service of Legal Documents Abroad <http://travel.state.gov/ 
law/ service_general.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).  
Unlike the Hague Convention, the Inter-American Service 
Convention does not purport to be the exclusive mechanism 
for serving parties located in signatory countries.  See, e.g., 
Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A., 22 F.3d 634, 639-44 
(5th Cir. 1994); Pizzabiocche v. Vinelli, 772 F Supp. 1245, 
1249 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Born, supra note 11 at 835. 
30.  The service methods set forth in Rule 4(j3)(2) are 
also available if the applicable international agreement 
allows service by other methods. 
31.  Convention, Art. 1; see also G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 
4(j3) (setting forth rules for effecting service “in a place not 
within the United States”). 
32.  See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700. 
33.  See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6); G.S. § 55-15-07 
(requiring foreign corporations authorized to transact 
business in North Carolina to maintain a registered agent); 
G.S. § 55D-33 (authorizing service on registered agent or, if 
no registered agent exists, upon the Secretary of State).  Cf. 
Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 64 N.C. App. 41, 306 S.E.2d 
562 (1983) (holding that service may be made upon 
Secretary of State where Secretary is proper agent for service 
of process, but incorrectly concluding that Secretary was 
proper agent in that case); Wilson, supra note 21 § 4-24, at 
74 n. 230 (noting incorrect conclusion in Bush). 
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Available Methods of Service Under the 
Hague Convention 
Under Rule 4(j3)(1), a party to a civil or commercial 
case requiring the transmission of service papers to a 
defendant in a Contracting State must use one of the 
procedures established by the Hague Convention.34  
The principal innovation of the Convention, and its 
primary and favored service mechanism, is service 
through the Central Authority of the country in which 
service is to be made. 
Article 2 of the Convention requires each 
Contracting State to establish a Central Authority to 
receive requests for service from other Contracting 
States.35  The Central Authority of the receiving State 
is obliged to execute service requests, either by formal 
service under the local law of the receiving State, or by 
a method requested by the serving party (unless that 
method is incompatible with the law of the receiving 
State), or by informal delivery to an addressee who 
voluntarily accepts service.36  Each Contracting State 
may require documents served by its Central Authority 
pursuant to local law to be translated into one of its 
official languages.37  After attempting – and hopefully 
completing – service, the Central Authority of the 
receiving State returns to the applicant a certificate 
describing the method, time, and place of service and 
                                                          
34.  See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705 (stating that 
“compliance with the Convention is mandatory in all cases to 
which it applies”); Convention Art. 1 (in civil or commercial 
matters, Convention applicable “in all cases” where 
documents must be transmitted abroad to obtain service). 
35.  See Convention Art. 2.  Information about each 
State's Central Authority can be found in the country-specific 
declarations appended to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 or on the 
Department of State’s website.  See supra note 14.  The 
United States Department of Justice is the Central Authority 
for the United States.  See 28 C.F.R. § 0.49(b).  Each 
Contracting State may also require that any requests for 
service originating from that country be channeled through 
its Central Authority.  Parties to U.S. litigation, however, 
need not channel requests for service in other Contracting 
States through the Department of Justice.  Instead, American 
attorneys may send requests directly to the Central Authority 
in the Contracting State where service is to be made.  See 
Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-2-1, at 173. 
36.  See Convention Art. 5. 
37.  See Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-2-3(5), at 184-89 
(suggesting that a State may require translation only if 
documents are to be served via its local law, rather than in a 
manner requested by the serving party). 
identifying the person to whom the documents were 
delivered.38 
The Convention, however, does not require use of 
the Central Authority mechanism.  Indeed, because 
service via the Central Authority can be time 
consuming and cumbersome, many litigants opt to use 
alternative service mechanisms identified by the 
Convention.  These include: 
Service via consular or diplomatic channels:  Each 
Contracting State may serve documents upon 
persons abroad directly through its diplomatic or 
consular agents.  Each State, however, may object 
to such service unless the document is to be served 
on a national of the State from which the 
documents originate.39  The Convention also 
permits Contracting States to use consular agents 
and, in exceptional circumstances, diplomatic 
agents to forward service documents to designated 
authorities in the receiving State.40  U.S. litigants, 
however, typically may not rely on these methods 
of service, as U.S. law prohibits foreign service 
officers from serving process, or appointing others 
to do so, in most cases.41 
Service through judicial officers, officials, or other 
competent persons:  The Convention also permits 
service to be made “directly through the judicial 
officers, officials, or other competent persons” of 
the State in which service is to be made, thus 
bypassing the Central Authority mechanism.42  
Contracting States may also object to this form of 
service.43 
                                                          
38.  See Convention Art. 6 (also requiring Central 
Authority to explain why documents were not served, if 
applicable). 
39.  See Convention Art. 8; see also Ristau, supra note 
14 § 4-3-5(4), at 217 (listing countries that have objected to 
service pursuant to Article 8). 
40.  See Convention Art. 9. 
41.  See 22 C.F.R. § 92.85. 
42.  Convention Art. 10(b), (c) (referring to “the 
freedom” of forum judicial officers, officials, or “other 
competent persons,” as well as “any person interested in a 
judicial proceeding,” to effect service directly through 
judicial officers, officials, or other competent persons of the 
State of destination). 
43.  See id.; see also Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-3-5(4), 
at 217 (listing countries that have objected). 
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Side agreements between Contracting States:  
Contracting States may also enter into separate 
agreements establishing additional service 
mechanisms.44  The United States does not appear 
to be a party to any such agreements.45 
Perhaps the most significant alternative service 
mechanism contemplated by the Convention, however, 
is service via “postal channels.”  This provision, 
contained in Article 10(a), has generated a substantial 
body of conflicting case law.  Because of this, and 
because service by mail is perhaps the most frequently 
attempted form of international service, the following 
sections of this bulletin discuss service by mail in 
detail. 
Service by mail under the Convention and 
the effect of Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 
Article 10(a) “has engendered more litigation in the 
United States than any other section of the 
Convention.”46  Courts in the United States, for 
example, are sharply divided on whether Article 10(a) 
permits international mail service at all, a question the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals appears to have 
answered in the affirmative.47  Moreover, there remain 
unanswered questions about the mechanics of 
international mail service, among them whether 
litigants or the clerk of court are responsible for mail 
service and whether the Convention, Rule 4(j3), or 
constitutional principles require translation of service 
papers.  The following sections attempt to provide 
guidance in answering these questions. 
 
                                                          
44.  See Convention Art. 11.  Article 11 appears 
primarily to contemplate “side agreements” permitting 
“direct communication between [the] respective authorities” 
of the Contracting States.  Id. (referencing such agreements 
“in particular”). 
45.  See Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-3-5(3), at 216.  
Article 19 of the Convention is a “savings provision,” which 
makes clear that the Convention does not abrogate more 
liberal service rules under which a Contracting State “permits 
methods of transmission . . . of documents coming from 
abroad, for service in its territory.”  Convention Art. 19; see 
also Born, supra note 11 at 812 & 822 n.8. 
46.  Born, supra note 11 at 811. 
47.  See infra notes 55 through 58 and accompanying 
text. 
The Hague Convention permits service by 
mail, provided the country in which service 
is to be made has not objected. 
At first glance, Article 10(a) of the Convention would 
seem to permit a litigant in one Contracting State to 
serve documents by mail on a party in another State.  
On closer scrutiny, however, the language of Article 
10(a) is less clear: 
Provided the State of destination does not 
object, the present Convention shall not 
interfere with — 
(a) the freedom to send judicial 
documents, by postal channels, 
directly to persons abroad. 
Unlike other provisions of the Convention, which 
expressly refer to methods of “serving” judicial 
documents,48 Article 10(a) refers merely to “the 
freedom to send judicial documents” by postal 
channels.49  Noting this distinction, many courts have 
interpreted Article 10(a) narrowly to allow litigants 
only to send case-related documents through the mail 
after service has been formally accomplished by other 
means.50  These courts reason that, because the 
                                                          
48.  See, e.g., Convention Art. 5 (requiring Central 
Authority to “serve the document or . . . arrange to have it 
served”); Art. 8 (Contracting States “shall be free to effect 
service” in some cases through diplomatic or consular 
agents); Art. 9 (Contracting States “shall be free” to use 
consular agents to forward documents “for the purpose of 
service” to authorities in country where service is to be 
made); Art. 10(b) & (c) (Convention “shall not interfere with 
. . . the freedom” of judicial officers and others “to effect 
service” through competent person of State where service is 
to be made); Art. 19 (raising prospect of alternative methods 
“for service” of documents permitted by internal law of 
country where service is to be made). 
49.  Convention Art. 10(a) (emphasis added). 
50.  See, e.g., Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA 
M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2002); Sardanis v. 
Sumitomo Corp., 279 A.D.2d 225, 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001); Knapp v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 60 F. Supp. 2d 
566, 573 (S.D. W.Va. 1999); Golub v. Isuzu Motors, 924 F. 
Supp. 324, 327-28 (D. Mass. 1996); Brand v. Mazda Motor 
of America, 920 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 (D. Kan. 1996); 
Pennebaker v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 155 F.R.D. 153, 157 
(S.D. Miss. 1994); Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 
F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989); Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior 
Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381-82 (1988); Prost v. Honda 
Motor Co., 122 F.R.D 215, 216-17 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Cooper 
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Convention uses the term “service” repeatedly in other 
Articles, the omission of that term from Article 10(a) 
must have been deliberate.51  By contrast, other courts 
disagree with this narrow interpretation and read 
Article 10(a) to permit service of process by mail.52  
These courts note that the express purpose of the 
Convention is to “create appropriate means to ensure 
that . . . documents to be served abroad shall be 
brought to the notice of the addressee,”53 and typically 
attribute the absence of the term “service” from Article 
10(a) to “careless drafting.”54 
The North Carolina cases are consistent with the 
broader interpretation of Article 10(a).  In Hayes v. 
Evergo Telephone Co., for example, the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals held that service upon a 
defendant in Hong Kong by international registered 
mail, return receipt requested, was consistent with the 
Hague Convention.55  Although the Court did not hold 
that Article 10(a) permits service by mail in all cases,56 
                                                                                         
v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16, 17 (D. Me. 1987); 
Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 466 (S.D. 
Miss. 1986); Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444, 446 
(S.D. Iowa 1985). 
51.  See, e.g., Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444, 
446 (S.D. Iowa 1985). 
52.  See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 802 
(9th Cir. 2004); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839-40 
(2d Cir. 1986); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 
2d 460, 470-74 (D.N.J. 1998); R. Griggs Group Ltd. v. 
Filanto Spa, 920 F. Supp. 1100, 1104-08 (D. Nev. 1996); 
Gapanovich v. Komori Corp., 605 A.2d 1120, 1123-24 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Patty v. Toyota Motor Corp., 
777 F. Supp. 956, 959 (N.D. Ga. 1991); Meyers v. ASICS 
Corp., 711 F. Supp. 1001, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1989); 
Hammond v. Honda Motor Co., 128 F.R.D. 638, 641 (D.S.C. 
1989); Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 566 A.2d 135, 143 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, 
Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Weight v. 
Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 1082, 1085-86 
(E.D. Va. 1984). 
53.  Convention, preamble (emphasis added). 
54.  Sandoval v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 527 A.2d 564, 
566 (Pa. Super. 1987). 
55.  100 N.C. App. 474, 479, 397 S.E.2d 325, 328 
(1980). 
56.  See id.  The Court held that service was proper “in 
this case,” relying in part on Article 19 of the Convention, 
which allows service by methods permitted by the internal 
law of the State where service is to be made.  The Court 
indicated that Hong Kong’s “internal law” permitted mail 
in subsequent cases the Court of Appeals has again 
stated that mail service is consistent with the 
Convention and Article 10(a).57  The Court of Appeals 
has thus aligned itself with those courts that have 
concluded that the Convention permits service by 
mail.58 
Numerous Contracting States object to 
service by mail. 
Although Article 10(a) may permit service by “postal 
channels,” each Contracting State retains the right to 
object to this manner of service.59  A number of States 
have exercised this right, including those on the 
following list: 
• Argentina  • Bulgaria 
• China  • Czech Republic 
• Egypt  • Germany 
• Greece  • Hungary 
• Latvia  • Lithuania 
                                                                                         
service, although it did not explain whether Hong Kong’s 
internal law permitted service by mail “of documents coming 
from abroad,” as Article 19 requires.  See supra note 45. 
57.  See, e.g., Warzynski, 102 N.C. App. at 228, 401 
S.E.2d at 805 (not mentioning Article 10(a) but affirming 
mail service on Spanish company under Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2); 
Peele, 136 N.C. App. at 208-09, 523 S.E.2d at 127 (stating 
that Article 10(a) permits mail service).  Note, however, that 
Article 10(a) may not have been at issue in Peele.  In that 
case, a German court apparently sent service papers in a 
German lawsuit to the U.S. Marshals Service, which served 
the defendant by mail in North Carolina.  Thus, service 
seems to have been made via the Central Authority 
mechanism – the Marshals Service formerly served 
documents on behalf of the U.S. Central Authority – and not 
via Article 10(a), which contemplates mail service “sent 
directly to persons abroad.”  Convention Art. 10(a). 
58.  See supra note 52.  This broader interpretation of 
Article 10(a) draws additional support from the negotiating 
history of the Convention and, apparently, is shared by the 
U.S. State Department.  See Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-3-5(2), 
at 205 (reviewing drafting history and concluding that “the 
draftsmen of the Convention intended the language ‘to send 
judicial documents, by postal channels’ to include the service 
of process”); Letter from Alan  J. Kreczko, U.S. Dep’t of 
State Deputy Legal Advisor, to the Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts (Mar. 14, 1991), quoted in U.S. Dep’t of State Op. 
Regarding the Bankston Case, 30 I.L.M. 260 (1991) 
(disagreeing with federal case holding that the Hague 
Convention does not permit service by registered mail). 
59.  See Convention Art. 10 & 21. 
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• Luxembourg • Norway 
• Poland  • Rep. of San Marino 
• Rep. of South Korea • Slovak Republic 
• Sri Lanka  • Switzerland 
• Turkey  • Ukraine 
• Venezuela60 
Courts have generally held that service by mail is 
improper in the countries that have objected to Article 
10(a).61  The few relevant North Carolina cases are 
consistent with this rule.  In Hayes, for example, the 
Court of Appeals upheld service by mail upon a 
defendant in Hong Kong, finding “particularly 
compelling the fact that . . . Hong Kong has not 
objected to any portion of Article 10.”62  Likewise, in 
Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, the Court of Appeals held 
that Article 10(a) did not authorize service on a 
defendant in Turkey, which has objected to service by 
mail.63  Therefore, litigants may not effect service by 
                                                          
60.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, accompanying materials 
(listing declarations of Contracting States); U.S. Dep’t of 
State flyer, Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of 
Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil and 
Commercial Matters <http://travel.state.gov/law/ hague_ 
service.html> (listing States that have objected to service via 
postal channels); Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, 
Declarations of the Republic of Hungary <http://hcch. e-
vision.nl/index_en.php?act =status.comment& csid=912& 
disp=resdn>; Declarations of the Republic of San Marino 
<http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act= status.comment& 
csid=437&disp=resdn>; Declarations of the Republic of 
Bulgaria <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=status. 
comment&csid=28&disp=resdn> (last visited Nov. 30, 
2004). 
61.  See, e.g., Shenouda v. Mehanna, 203 F.R.D. 166, 
171 (D.N.J. 2001); Davies v. Jobs & Adverts Online, Gmbh, 
94 F. Supp. 2d  719, 721 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2000); Lyman Steel 
Corp. v. Ferrostaal Metals Corp., 747 F. Supp. 389, 399-400 
(N.D. Ohio 1990); Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche A.G. v. Superior 
Court, 123 Cal.App.3d 755, 761-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see 
also DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 
288 (3d Cir.1981) (Convention authorizes methods of service 
in addition to Central Authority mechanism “as long as the 
nation receiving service has not objected to the method 
used”). 
62.  100 N.C. App. at 479, 397 S.E.2d at 328; see also 
Peele, 136 N.C. App. at 208-09, 523 S.E.2d at 127 (noting 
that the Convention authorizes service by mail and that the 
United States had not objected to such service).  
63.  See 124 N.C. App. at 263, 477 S.E.2d at 243 
(approving service notwithstanding this defect after holding 
that formal defects in service are not necessarily fatal in child 
mail upon parties located in the Contracting States 
listed above.  Service by mail is permitted, however, in 
the remaining States listed in Table A.64 
The fact that Article 10(a) permits service by mail 
in a particular State, however, does not end the inquiry, 
because Article 10(a) says nothing about what 
procedures, if any, govern mail service.  The following 
sections therefore address two unanswered procedural 
questions.  First, must parties attempting mail service 
in a Contracting State comply with North Carolina 
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j3)(2)c.2, the only provision 
that expressly authorizes service by mail in foreign 
countries?  Second, must service papers be translated 
into an official language of the country in which 
service is to be made, or translated into a language 
spoken by the defendant?   
Procedural requirements governing service 
by mail 
Rule 4(j3)(2) authorizes a number of alternative 
methods of service in cases where there is no 
“internationally agreed means of service” or “the 
applicable international agreement allows other means 
of service.”65  Of particular relevance here is 
4(j3)(2)c.2, the only provision in the Rules of Civil 
Procedure expressly to authorize international mail 
service.66  The rule imposes two significant 
                                                                                         
custody cases where defendant has actual notice of the 
action). 
64.  The fact that a State has not objected to a method 
of service, however, does not necessarily mean that the 
State’s courts will enforce the resulting U.S. judgment.  
Japan, for example, does not object to service by mail but has 
stated that its failure to object “does not necessarily imply 
that [mail service] . . . is considered valid service in Japan; it 
merely indicates that Japan does not consider it as an 
infringement of its sovereign power.”  See Hague Conf. on 
Private Int’l Law:  Special Comm’n Report on the Operation 
of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence 
Convention, 28 Int’l Legal Mat. 1556, 1561 (1989); see also 
U.S. Dep’t of State flyer, Service of Process in Japan 
<http://travel.state.gov/law/japan_service.html> (noting 
potential enforcement problems) (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). 
65.  G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(2).   
66.  Although Rule 4(j)(1)c authorizes service “within 
or without” North Carolina by registered or certified mail, 
return receipt requested, this general service provision 
presumably does not authorize international mail service in a 
manner inconsistent with the more specific provisions 
contained in Rule 4(j3).  Cf. Fowler v. Valencourt, 334 N.C. 
345, 349, 435 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1993) (“Where one of two 
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requirements:  service must be by “any form of mail 
requiring a signed receipt,” and the documents must be 
“addressed and dispatched by the clerk of court to the 
party to be served.”67  These procedures generally 
must be followed if there is no “internationally agreed 
means” of mail service available under Rule 4(j3)(1), 
as when the party to be served is located in a country 
that has not ratified or acceded to the Hague 
Convention.  The question remains, however, whether 
service by mail must always satisfy Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2, 
even when the party to be served is located in a 
Contracting State. 
The answer to this question depends on whether 
Rule 4(j3)(1) authorizes the use of all methods of 
service identified by the Convention.  Recall that Rule 
4(j3)(1) directs litigants to effect service “[b]y any 
internationally agreed means . . . such as those means 
authorized by the Hague Convention.”  Because the 
Convention clearly authorizes use of its Central 
Authority mechanism, this method of service is 
available to litigants under Rule 4(j3)(1).68  But 
matters are not so clear with respect to Article 10(a). 
Is service via postal channels an “internationally 
agreed means” of service, or one “authorized” by the 
Convention?  If it is, then this method of service is 
available under Rule 4(j3)(1).  And, because neither 
Rule 4(j3)(1) nor Article 10(a) require any particular 
type of mail service,69 litigants could presumably use 
any form of mail reasonably calculated to notify the 
defendant of the action.70  By contrast, if Article 10(a) 
                                                                                         
statutes might apply to the same situation, the statute which 
deals more directly and specifically with the situation 
controls over the statute of more general applicability.”).  
Likewise, although 4(j3)(2)a authorizes service “in a manner 
prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in 
that country in an action in any of its courts of general 
jurisdiction,” it is unlikely that this provision was intended to 
authorize international service by mail.  See, e.g., 
Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 806-08 (9th Cir. 2004) (so 
holding with respect to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(A)). 
67.  G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2. 
68.  See Born, supra note 11 at 808 n.5(b). 
69.  See Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-3-5(2), at 205 
(quoting report on draft Convention:  “The Commission did 
not accept the proposal that postal channels be limited to 
registered mail”). 
70.  See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(1) (authorizing service 
by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to 
give notice); see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (due process 
merely permits litigants to use postal channels if forum 
law specifically authorizes them to do so, a North 
Carolina plaintiff arguably would have to comply with 
Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.71 
Although there is little law in North Carolina or 
elsewhere on this issue, there is some reason to believe 
that international mail service must comply with Rule 
4(j3)(2)c.2.  First, if the Convention is meant to 
authorize mail service even where forum law provides 
no such authority, then the text of Article 10(a) is 
poorly suited to achieving that goal.  Article 10(a) 
simply provides that the Convention “shall not 
interfere with . . . the freedom” to send documents by 
mail.72  This of course begs the question:  what 
freedom?  Presumably, if a litigant is “free” to effect 
service in a particular way, it is because other (non-
Convention) law authorizes service to be made in that 
manner.73 
The negotiating history of the Convention appears 
to be consistent with the view that forum law must 
authorize international mail service.  According to a 
report on the text of the draft convention: 
It should be stressed that in permitting the 
utilization of postal channels, provided the 
state of destination does not object, the draft 
convention did not intend to pass on the 
validity of this mode of transmission under 
the law of the forum state:  in order for the 
postal channel to be utilized, it is necessary 
                                                                                         
requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise defendant of 
the action and an opportunity to present objections). 
71.  Because under this reading the Convention would 
allow, but not authorize, service by “postal channels,” the 
mail service provisions of Rule 4(j3)(2) would be available.  
See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(2) (listing service methods 
available if there is no “internationally agreed means” of 
service or if the “applicable international agreement” allows 
other methods). 
72.  Compare this language to the detailed provisions 
governing service via the Central Authority mechanism.  See 
Convention Art. 3-7. 
73.  Cf. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700 (looking to forum law 
to determine whether service required transmittal of 
document abroad, thus implicating the Convention). 
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that it be authorized by the law of the forum 
state.74 
Although this report commented on a prior draft of 
Article 10, except for “minor editorial changes” the 
final text corresponds to that of the draft.75 
The U.S. Department of State likewise appears to 
assume that international mail service must comply 
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), the federal 
counterpart to North Carolina’s Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.  A 
Department of State circular discussing service of legal 
documents abroad states: 
SERVICE BY INTERNATIONAL 
REGISTERED MAIL:  (Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), 
F.R. Cv. P.) registered or certified mail, return 
receipt requested may be sent to most 
countries in the world.  Rule 4(f)(2)(C) 
provides that this method of service may be 
used unless prohibited by the law of the 
foreign country.76  
Notwithstanding the text of Article 10(a) and the 
negotiating and interpretive history discussed above, 
federal courts have disagreed about the need to comply 
with the procedures set out in federal Rule 4.  Some 
courts have held that the Convention provides 
independent authority for international mail service 
regardless whether the serving party complies with 
Rule 4.77  Other courts, however, have required 
                                                          
74.  Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-3-5(2), at 205 (quoting 
Service Convention Negotiating Document at 90) (translated 
from French by Ristau). 
75.  See id. (citing Service Convention Negotiating 
Document at 373). 
76.  U.S. Department of State flyer, Service of Legal 
Documents Abroad ¶ E <http://travel.state. gov/law/ 
service_general.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).  The 
Department of State flyer lists no source of authority for 
international mail service other than Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(f)(2)(C)(ii), the text of which is identical to that of North 
Carolina’s Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2. 
77.  These courts typically have reached this conclusion 
by reasoning that the Convention “supplements” federal Rule 
4, rather than by interpreting Rule 4(f)(1) – the twin of N.C. 
Rule 4(j3)(1) – to authorize international mail service.  See, 
e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(evaluating service by German plaintiff on U.S. defendant 
and stating that the Convention “‘supplements’ – and is 
manifestly not limited by – [federal] Rule 4”); Modefine, S.A. 
v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 164 F.R.D. 24, 
litigants to comply with federal Rule 4.  In Brockmeyer 
v. May,78 for example, a federal district court declined 
to set aside a default judgment that had been entered 
against a company registered under the law of the 
United Kingdom.  The defendant had been served by 
ordinary first class mail addressed and dispatched by 
the plaintiff.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, explaining that, although the Hague 
Convention permitted mail service, “Article 10(a) does 
not itself affirmatively authorize international mail 
service.”79  The Court reasoned: 
[W]e must look outside the Hague 
Convention for affirmative authorization of 
the international mail service that is merely 
not forbidden by Article 10(a).  Any 
affirmative authorization of service by 
international mail, and any requirements as to 
how that service is to be accomplished, must 
come from the law of the forum in which the 
suit is filed.80 
Based on this reasoning, the court held that the 
plaintiff’s chosen method of service – sending the 
summons and complaint by ordinary first class mail to 
a post office address for the defendant – was not 
authorized by any provision of federal Rule 4.  This 
holding echoes that of Borschow Hospital & Medical 
Supplies, Inc. v. Burdick-Siemens Corp., in which a 
federal district court concluded that service must 
conform to the international mail provisions of federal 
Rule 4.81 
The few North Carolina cases to address the 
validity of international mail service do not make clear 
whether service must comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.  
At times, courts seem to have assumed that parties 
                                                                                         
25-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying Ackerman to service by 
U.S. plaintiff on foreign defendant:  “Even though the use of 
international registered mail may be invalid under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 4 to effectuate service upon a foreign party, the rule 
of this Circuit is clear and broad:  the Hague Convention 
“‘supplements’” the Federal Rules thereby providing an 
independent manner of service”). 
78.  383 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2004). 
79.  Id. at 803. 
80.  Id. at 804. 
81.  143 F.R.D. 472, 486 (D. Puerto Rico 1992) (mail 
service on a foreign defendant is proper but must conform to 
the international mail service provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, 
then contained in Rule 4(i)). 
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must comply with the rule.  In Warzynski v. Empire 
Comfort Systems, for example, the Court of Appeals 
upheld service by mail on a Spanish defendant.  In a 
brief analysis, the Court noted that the plaintiff had 
complied with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.82  Likewise, in Hocke 
v. Hanyane, the Court of Appeals affirmed a default 
judgment entered against a South African defendant 
after evaluating whether service complied with Rule 
4(j3)(2)c.2.83  These holdings are consistent with the 
text of Rule 4(j3) itself, which requires that “[p]roof of 
service by mail shall include an affidavit or certificate 
of addressing and mailing by the clerk of court.”84 
In Hayes v. Evergo Telephone Company, Ltd., 
however, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of 
mail service upon a defendant in Hong Kong, even 
though the plaintiff, rather than the clerk, apparently 
mailed the service papers.85  Although the Court 
discussed whether Article 10(a) permitted service by 
mail and ultimately concluded that service “was in 
conformity with the provisions of the Hague 
Convention,” it did not discuss the fact that service 
was not in conformity with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2. 86 
Under North Carolina law, therefore, it is not 
certain whether international mail service must comply 
with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.  A variety of factors, however, 
suggest that litigants must comply with the rule.  As 
discussed above, these factors include the text and 
negotiating history of the Convention, which arguably 
                                                          
82.  102 N.C. App. at 228, 401 S.E.2d at 805 (“Rule 
4(j3) establishes procedures for service of process in a 
foreign country.  The rule allows for service by any form of 
mail requiring a signed receipt and addressed and dispatched 
by the clerk of court to the party to be served.”).  
83.  118 N.C. App. at 632-634, 456 S.E.2d at 859-60. 
84.  G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3) (emphasis added). 
85.  See 100 N.C. App. at 476, 397 S.E.2d at 327 
(noting that “Plaintiff effected service of process . . . by 
sending the summons, together with the complaint via 
registered mail, return receipt requested”). 
86.  Id. at 479, 397 S.E.2d at 328.  And in Tataragasi v. 
Tataragasi, 124 N.C. App. 255, 477 S.E.2d 239 (1996), the 
Court of Appeals upheld the validity of service by mail, in a 
child custody action, on a defendant in Turkey, even though 
Turkey has objected to Article 10(a) and the plaintiff failed 
to comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.  Tataragasi is an unusual 
case, however, and the Court appeared to limit its holding to 
child custody cases in which the plaintiff attempts in good 
faith to comply with the Convention and the defendant has 
actual notice of the action.  See id. at 264, 477 S.E.2d at 244. 
suggest that service by mail is not an “internationally 
agreed means” of service available to litigants under 
Rule 4(j3)(1).87  Moreover, by requiring an affidavit or 
certificate from the clerk as proof of service by mail, 
Rule 4(j3) arguably envisions compliance with 
4(j3)(2)c.2 in all cases.  Until the appellate courts 
provide definitive guidance on this issue, a litigant who 
wishes to use the mails to serve a party located in a 
Contracting State to the Hague Convention would be 
prudent to comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.88 
Translation requirements for service papers 
A plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 is 
only one of the grounds on which a defendant may 
challenge international mail service.  Another common 
challenge is to the plaintiff’s failure to translate the 
service papers.89  This challenge typically takes one of 
two forms.  In some cases, a defendant may argue that 
the Hague Convention requires translation into the 
official language of the country in which service is 
made.  As will be explained, courts are nearly uniform 
in rejecting this argument.  A more serious objection is 
that due process requires that the summons and 
                                                          
87.  Though the text of the Convention and Rule 4(j3) 
may permit this reading, note the potential for unusual 
(arguably undesirable) results if a similar analysis is applied 
to the Convention’s other “alternative” service methods.  
Consider, for example, an interpretation under which the 
Central Authority mechanism is the only “internationally 
agreed means” of service available under Rule 4(j3)(1).  See 
supra note 48 (quoting Art. 8-10, each of which, like Article 
10(a), refers to the “free[dom]” to use particular service 
methods).  Under this interpretation, litigants could use the 
Convention’s numerous “alternative” service methods only if 
they were listed in Rule 4(j3)(2) or ordered by the court 
under Rule 4(j3)(3).  See Born, supra n. 11 at 808 n.5(c).  
But Rule 4(j3)(2) does not list some of the Convention’s 
“alternative” service methods, such as service through 
diplomatic or consular channels.  See id. & n.5(d) (also 
noting that Convention might “supplement” Rule 4). 
88.  Note that Rule 4(j3)(3) permits service upon 
defendants in foreign countries “[b]y other means not 
prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by 
the court.”  Under this rule, mail service that did not comply 
with 4(j3)(2)c.2 might be proper if made pursuant to a court 
order and if the method chosen was not prohibited by an 
international agreement.  See, e.g., Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 
805-06; Levin v. Rush Trading Co., 248 F. Supp. 537, 540 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (upholding service by ordinary mail on 
defendant and his attorneys pursuant to court order). 
89.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Dusselberg v. Peele, 136 
N.C. App. 206, 211, 523 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1999).  
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complaint be translated into a language understood by 
the defendant.  Each of these potential objections to 
service is addressed below. 
Litigants who attempt service through the 
receiving State’s Central Authority may be required to 
translate the summons and complaint into an official 
language of the receiving State.  Recall that service via 
the Central Authority mechanism includes three 
potential methods of service:  service “by a method 
proscribed by [the receiving State’s] internal law” for 
service in domestic actions upon persons located 
within its territory; service by a method requested by 
the serving party; or voluntary acceptance by the party 
being served.90  Under Article 5 of the Convention, 
Contracting States may require translation of 
documents served by the first of these methods.91 
In a number of cases, defendants have attempted 
to extend this translation requirement to service by 
mail.  The text of the Convention offers little support 
for such a requirement:  Article 10 does not expressly 
authorize receiving States to impose translation 
requirements, and Article 5 is plainly limited to service 
via the receiving State’s Central Authority.92  Nor do 
the federal or relevant state rules of civil procedure 
contain such a requirement.  Not surprisingly, then, in 
virtually every case courts have limited the 
Convention’s translation provisions to service via the 
Central Authority mechanism.93 
                                                          
90.  See Convention Art. 5; see also supra notes 35-38 
and accompanying text (discussing Central Authority 
mechanism). 
91.  See id.; see also Ristau, supra note 14 § 4-2-3(5), 
at 184-89 (discussing translation requirement); Born, supra 
note 11 at 802-03 (same). 
92.  See Convention Art. 5 (“If the document is to be 
served under the first paragraph above [referring to Central 
Authority mechanism], the Central Authority may require” 
translation). 
93.  See, e.g., Taft v. Moreau, 177 F.R.D. 201, 204 (D. 
Vt. 1997); Parsons v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., 565 So. 
2d 20, 25 (Ala. 1990); Hammond v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 
128 F.R.D. 638, 640 (D.S.C. 1989); Lemme v. Wine of Japan 
Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Weight 
v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 
(E.D. Va. 1984).  But see Borschow Hospital &  Med. 
Supplies, Inc. v. Burdick-Siemens Corp., 143 F.R.D. 472, 480 
(D. Puerto Rico 1992) (holding that service by mail must be 
translated in order to achieve the notice goals of service, 
although not basing this holding on the Convention). 
The North Carolina appellate courts have not 
clearly addressed whether Rule 4(j3) requires litigants 
to translate service documents.  The most pertinent 
case appears to be State ex rel. Dusselberg v. Peele,94 
in which the Court of Appeals entertained a North 
Carolina defendant’s challenge to the alleged failure to 
translate a summons and complaint.  In Peele, the U.S. 
Marshals Service received process issued by a German 
court in a child support action and served the defendant 
by mail.  The German court entered a judgment against 
the defendant, which the plaintiff registered in North 
Carolina.  The defendant moved to vacate registration 
of the judgment, in part because the service papers he 
received allegedly had not been translated into English.  
The Court of Appeals, however, held that the evidence 
was sufficient to find that the defendant had, in fact, 
received a translation of the summons and complaint 
and, therefore, that “the trial court could have found 
that defendant was properly served.”95 
For a number of reasons, however, Peele does not 
answer whether Rule 4(j3) or Article 10(a) require 
translation of service documents.  First, the defendant 
in Peele appears to have been served via the Central 
Authority mechanism, and the case therefore did not 
require interpretation of Article 10(a).96  Second, the 
mail service in Peele was accomplished under Rule 
4(j)(1)(c), and the Court of Appeals therefore was not 
required to interpret Rule 4(j3), which governs service 
of U.S. process on defendants in foreign countries.97  
Third, the Peele court did not expressly hold that a 
translation was required and did not identify the source 
of such a requirement. 
The likeliest source of any translation requirement 
– whether documents are served by mail or any other 
means – is the constitutional requirement of due 
process, which guarantees a defendant “notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
                                                          
94.  136 N.C. App. 206, 523 S.E.2d 125 (1999). 
95.  Id. at 211, 523 S.E.2d at 128.   
96.  Until recently, the U.S. Marshals Service handled 
service for the U.S. Central Authority, the Department of 
State.  See, e.g., Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 n.8 
(2d Cir. 1986).  Thus, service in Peele appears to have been 
made by the first method authorized by Article 5:  service by 
the Central Authority in a manner prescribed by the internal 
law of the receiving State.  See Convention Art. 5; see also 
supra note 57 (discussing Peele). 
97.  See Peele, 136 N.C. App. at 208, 523 S.E.2d at 
127. 
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apprise [him or her] of the pendency of the action and 
afford . . . an opportunity to present [his or her] 
objections.”98  As a number of courts have noted, due 
process may require service of documents translated 
into a language understood by the defendant.99  Like 
these courts, the Court of Appeals in Peele seems to 
have been concerned primarily with whether the 
defendant received notice sufficient to enable him to 
understand the action and to present any objections.  
Indeed, the Court emphasized that the defendant had 
received and signed for the summons and complaint, 
had taken these papers to his lawyer, and had 
acknowledged “‘that he knew what [the papers were] 
concerning.”100 
In this respect, Peele is consistent with numerous 
cases from other jurisdictions and indicates that, in 
North Carolina, failure to translate documents into a 
language understood by the defendant may raise due 
process concerns.  Whether due process requires 
translation in a particular case will necessarily be a 
fact-specific inquiry.101  A thorough discussion of this 
due process issue is beyond the scope of this bulletin, 
but as a general rule courts have upheld service of 
untranslated documents where the defendant 
understands the documents or takes the papers to an 
attorney who understands them.102  In other cases, 
                                                          
98.  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; McDonald’s Corp. v. 
Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 448, 450 S.E.2d 888, 891 (1994). 
99.  See, e.g., Mario Valente Collezioni, Ltd. v. 
Confezioni Semeraro Paolo, S.R.L., 115 F. Supp. 2d 367 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Lafarge Corp. v. M/V MACEDONIA 
HELLAS, 2000 WL 687708 at *12 (E.D. La. 2000); Heredia 
v. Transport S.A.S., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000); Taft v. Moreau, 177 F.R.D. 201, 204 (D. Vt. 1997); 
Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986); Parsons v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., 
565 So. 2d 20, 25 (Ala. 1990). 
100. 136 N.C. App. at 211, 523 S.E.2d at 128. 
101. See, e.g., Bliek v. Palmer, 102 F.3d 1472, 1475 
(8th Cir. 1997) (“Due process is a flexible concept and a 
determination of what process is due, or what notice is 
adequate, depends upon the particular circumstances 
involved.”); James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 
F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (precise requirements of 
due process depend on circumstances; in every case, 
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard is required).  
102. See, e.g., Confezioni Semeraro Paolo, S.R.L., 115 
F. Supp. 2d at 372 (serving untranslated summons and 
complaint on Italian defendant did not violate due process 
where defendant immediately took papers to English 
failure to translate service papers may violate a 
defendant’s right to due process.  
Service of process on members of the 
U.S. armed forces 
Lawsuits requiring international service of process 
frequently involve members of the U.S. Armed Forces 
stationed abroad.  Members of the Armed Forces are 
subject to the same rules governing service of process 
as other persons living abroad.103  Military policies, 
however, can affect the method and availability of 
service in particular cases.  This section briefly 
discusses how these policies impact service on 
members of the Armed Forces.  Readers interested in a 
more thorough treatment of service of process on 
members of the Armed Forces should read 
Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/08, 
Service of Process and the Military (Dec. 2004). 
Military authorities are not responsible for serving 
process on members of the Armed Forces or civilians 
working or residing on military installations.104  
Military authorities, however, will generally determine 
whether a servicemember will accept service and will 
convey documents to the servicemember if he or she 
agrees to accept them.  Absent voluntary acceptance, 
however, military authorities generally play no further 
role in service and, instead, inform the serving party to 
                                                                                         
speaking attorney); Lafarge Corp., 2000 WL 687708 at *12 
(serving untranslated documents did not violate due process 
where defendant did not claim inability to understand 
documents); Heredia, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 162 (no due process 
violation where evidence demonstrated some competence in 
English and defendant signed return receipt that 
accompanied service of process); Taft, 177 F.R.D. at 204 
(service of untranslated document did not violate due process 
where defendants did not claim lack of notice or inability to 
understand document); Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 464 (no due 
process violation where summons, but not complaint, was 
translated into defendant’s language). 
103. Rule 4(j3) applies to “service upon a defendant . . . 
effected in a place not within the United States” and does not 
distinguish members of the Armed Forces from other civil 
litigants. 
104. The military has generally avoided directly serving 
process on servicemembers, in part due to a concern that 
providing such assistance to civil litigants would violate the 
Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, which criminalizes 
“willfully us[ing] any part of the Army or the Air Force as a 
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws.”  See 
Cook, supra note 8 at 173. 
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comply with service procedures established by the law 
of the pertinent foreign country.105 
A servicemember stationed abroad in a 
Contracting State may be served by the Central 
Authority of that State.  In certain cases, however, the 
Central Authority mechanism may be unavailable or 
inefficient.   For example, the foreign Central 
Authority may not have the right to enter the military 
installation to serve process.  Whether the Central 
Authority has this right is governed by the applicable 
Status of Forces agreement between the United States 
and the country in which the military installation is 
located.  If not allowed to enter the installation, the 
Central Authority may attempt service outside the 
installation, but there is no guarantee that it will 
successfully complete service.  Some foreign Central 
Authorities, moreover, may decline to attempt service 
at all under the applicable Status of Forces 
agreement.106 
Because the Central Authority mechanism may be 
unreliable or inefficient, many litigants attempt to 
serve members of the Armed Forces via international 
mail.  Once again, the same rules governing mail 
service apply to servicemembers as to civilians who 
are not affiliated with the military.  Therefore, as 
discussed above, litigants would be prudent to comply 
with the requirements of Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 in all cases, 
even if the servicemember is stationed in a Contracting 
State.  And, as discussed above, service by mail is not 
allowed in those countries that have objected to service 
by “postal channels.”107 
The Department of Defense operates Military Post 
Offices (MPOs) for military personnel overseas or on 
ships where the U.S. Postal Service does not 
operate.108  Military policy appears to require MPO 
                                                          
105. See 32 C.F.R. 516.12(c) (Army regulation 
establishing policies for service of state court process outside 
the U.S.); 32 C.F.R. 516.13 (listing contact information for 
those seeking assistance or information concerning service of 
process overseas); 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(2) (Navy policies 
governing service of out-of-state process). 
106. See U.S. Dep’t of State Flyer, Service of Legal 
Documents Abroad ¶ N (Sept. 2000) <http://travel.state.gov/ 
law/service_general.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). 
107. See supra page 9. 
108. See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Dir. 4525.6-M, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSTAL MANUAL at 17 (Aug. 15, 
2002).  Servicemembers in the Army or Air Force have 
Army Post Office (APO) addresses, and members of the 
personnel to obtain the addressee’s signature prior to 
delivering mail for which a return receipt has been 
requested and to “return the receipt(s) promptly to the 
source.”109  If a servicemember refuses to accept 
certified or registered mail, MPO personnel should 
endorse the document “refused” and return it to the 
sender.110  Proof that the summons and complaint were 
delivered to the servicemember should therefore be 
available in most cases. 
Conclusion 
International service of process, though “complex and 
time consuming,”111 has become considerably more 
regularized in recent years.  If the Hague Convention 
applies, the receiving State’s Central Authority may be 
able to serve the summons and complaint.  Moreover, 
service by mail is often available, both in countries 
where the Hague Convention applies and in countries  
not party to such international agreements.  Rule 
4(j3)(2)c.2 establishes the procedures governing mail 
service.  While there remains some question whether 
these procedures must be followed to complete mail 
service in Contracting States to the Hague Convention, 
there is a substantial argument that litigants must 
comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 in all cases.  Because 
members of the U.S. Armed Forces must be served in 
the same manner as civilian litigants, these procedures 
apply to mail service on members of the military as 
well.
                                                                                         
Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps. have Fleet Post 
Office (FPO) addresses.  See id.    
109. Id. ¶ C3.2.7.1.10, at 73. 
110. See id. ¶ C3.2.5.8.1, at 71. 
111. See supra note 10. 
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Table A 
States that have ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention112 
 
•   Anguilla 
•   Antigua and Barbuda 
•   Argentina 
•   Aruba 
•   Bahamas 
•   Barbados 
•   Belarus 
•   Belgium 
•   Belize† 
•   Bermuda 
•   Botswana 
•   British Virgin Islands 
•   Bulgaria 
•   Canada 
•   Cayman Islands 
•   China 
•   Cyprus 
•   Czech Republic 
•   Denmark 
•   Djibouti (formerly Afars 
and Issas)† 
•   Egypt 
•   Estonia 
•   Falklands Islands 
•   Fiji† 
•   Finland 
•   France (incl. French 
Overseas Depts.) 
 
•   French Polynesia† 
•   Germany 
•   Gibraltar† 
•   Greece 
•   Guernsey 
•   Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region 
•   Hungary‡ 
•   Ireland 
•   Isle of Man 
•   Israel 
•   Italy 
•   Japan 
•   Jersey 
•   Korea, Republic of (South Korea)  
•   Kuwait 
•   Kiribati (formerly Gilbert Islands and 
Central and Southern Line Islands) † 
•   Latvia 
•   Lithuania 
•   Luxembourg 
•   Macau Special Administrative Region 
•   Malawi 
•   Mexico 
•   Montserrat 
•   Netherlands 
•   Nevis† 
•   Norway 
•   Pakistan 
•   Pitcairn 
•   Poland 
•   Portugal 
•   Romania‡ 
•   Russian Federation 
•   St. Christopher (Kitts) 
•   St. Helena and Dependencies 
•   St. Lucia 
•   St. Vincent and the Grenadines† 
•   San Marino 
•   Seychelles 
•   Slovak Republic 
•   Slovenia 
•   Solomon Islands† 
•   Spain 
•   Sri Lanka 
•   Sweden 
•   Switzerland 
•   Turkey 
•   Turks and Caicos Islands 
•   Tuvalu (formerly Ellice Islands) † 
•   Ukraine 
•   United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 
•   United States (incl. Guam, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands) 
•   Venezuela 
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112. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, accompanying materials (listing parties to Convention and declarations of Contracting States). 
† See U.S. Dep’t of State flyer, Hague Convention on the Serv. Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil 
and Comm. Matters <http://travel.state.gov/law/hague_service.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).  The list assumes the 
Convention remains in force in countries that have achieved independence after it was extended to them, including Belize, 
Djibouti, Fiji, Kiribati, Nevis, St. Christopher, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu.  See id. 
‡  See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table:  Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service 
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act= 
conventions.status&cid=17#nonmem> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004) (noting recent accession of Hungary and Romania; 
Convention enters into force in Hungary April 1, 2005). 
